I. The Slippery Nature of the Rule of Law
Which signals must we heed in search of assessing and ascertaining the current state of the 'rule of law'? Are we to look for instances of triumphant rescue or of tragic failure of the concept? Must we be on the look-out for judicial pronouncements, legislative advances or administrative orders to test the rule of law's current temperature and mode of operation? Is it sufficient to apply a public law lens in order to seek out the institutional and procedural forms of the rule of law's modes of existence and their possible transformations in a world marked by globalisation, privatization and attending shifts between governmental regulatory prerogative and the market's claims to 'self-rule'? Or, ought we to include contractual and corporate governance developments, both still under the auspices of private law, when we attempt to depict the contours of far-reaching deregulations and the rise of private regulatory regimes in both industry and former public service areas? When studying the rule of law 'in action', its mode of generating knowledge and processing information, its instruments of 'control', of surveillance and intervention -how does a traditional constitutional or administrative rule of law perspective apply to the increasingly dominant role played by private companies exercising near-to-complete control over data flows? 2 College,  28  April  2016,  available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2786698; see also Neha Vora, Impossible Citizens (2013), at 12: "…an approach to studying citizenship and belonging that attends to the circulation and practice of multiple forms of governance in contemporary nation-states. This approach avoids exceptionalizing particular parts of the world and instead acknowledges that globally and locally circulating vocabulatires of economy, belonging, and rights are assembled, disassembled, and reassembled everywhere.". charged and contested as that of the 'rule of law' [RoL] . While references to the RoL abound and the concept is arguably one of the most frequently alluded to when debating the foundations and aspirations of a modern legal system, 7 the term itself
continues to remain open-ended, contested as well as burdened with conflicting normative assertions: while it conjures community as well as insists on authority and emphasizes rule-boundedness as well as promises enforceability, it does not say very much outright as to its stakeholders and its constituents, those who give it legitimacy and those who are affected by it. Whose Rule of Law are we speaking of, which values are enshrined in its concrete instantiation in a particular place and time? Which processes of legitimation and execution does it require or presuppose? Which actors are considered central or peripheral to the optimal operation of the RoL? Which norms can the RoL not do without, and what is their place in the RoL's system? Does the RoL require a hierarchy of norms, and does the concept itself allow for an identification of the values for that hierarchy?
The significance of the RoL within the legal (and political) imagination, as numerous attempts to define and conceptualize, 8 theorize, challenge 9 and resist it, 10 have shown, might just as well be its irreducibly ambiguous character. Its slippery nature not only invites both the interpretation from various points of view and the translation between its use in legal, political, socio-economic, historical and anthropological and sociological discourses, it demands them. But, seen through this lens, the 'RoL problem' for law echoes the challenges which other disciplines tend to encounter with 'core' concepts.
Imagine asking a philosopher to provide us with a summary regarding the idea of 7 See the masterful analysis and overview of approaches by Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law (2004). But, see also the World Bank's inclusion of the RoL as one of "six dimensions of governance" as part of its "Worldwide Governance Indicators Programme": http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/rule-of-law. 8 For a very helpful and insightful guide to competing interventions, see Christopher May, The Rule of Law. The Common Sense of Global Politics (2014), ch. 2 ("Defining the rule of law, between thick and thin conceptions", id., at 33-56. 9 Katharina Pistor/Antara Haldar/Amrit Amirapu, Social norms, rule of law, and gender reality. An essaay on the limits of the dominant rule of law paradigm, in: Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law 241 (Heckman/Nelson/Cabatingan, eds., 2010), who address the RoL's shortcomings in capturing and theorizing levels of inequality, using women as but one example; see also the critique of the World Justice Forum's 'Rule of Law' index, which prioritizes a limited range of economic and political factors to the detriment of others: Jothie Rajah, 'Rule of Law' as Transnational Legal Order, in: Transnational Legal Orders 340 (Halliday/Shaffer, eds., 2015). 10 'truth' 11 or of 'beauty'. 12 Or, if we asked a political theorist to define 'order', 13 or a (legal) philosopher to offer a satisfying definition of 'justice'. 14 Similarly related to these types of questions in the context of the RoL are those which are now raised within the fields of geography, legal geography and spatial studies with regard to 'jurisdiction' and to the 'place of law'.
Several crucial parameters become visible here: on the one hand, scholars in these fields debate the 'horizontal' and 'vertical' situatedness of legal orders while simultaneously emphasizing the contextual embeddedness of the legal architecture in historically evolving political orders and, more particularly, that of law's role in the West's emergence of the nation-state 15 and the capitalist order. 16 On the other, the RoL's normative ambiguity, in other words, its slippery assertion of a value system caught up, endorsed and given validity in the constitution and the execution of an institutionalized legal architecture prompts challenge and resistance on various other levels. The RoL both posits and questions normative assertions of a legal order and how and for whom it is established. Who is setting up the RoL, whose values does it serve to represent and protect? As such, the critique of the RoL cannot be sensibly separated from an assessment of the historical and socio-economic context in which a particular instantiation of the RoL is being debated, something which E. P. Thompson so masterfully laid out in the bulk of 'Whigs' that precedes the famous observations on the rule of law at the end of the book, too often cited in isolation from the rest. 17 "The intellectual odyssey of the concept of legal pluralism moves from the discovery of indigenous forms of law among remote African villagers and New Guinea tribesmen to debates concerning the pluralistic qualities of law under advanced capitalism. In the last decade, the concept of legal pluralism has been applied to the study of social and legal ordering in urban industrial societies, primarily the United States, Britain, and France. Indeed, given a sufficiently broad definition of the term legal system, virtually every society is legally plural, whether or not it has a colonial past. Legal pluralism is a central theme in the reconceptualization of the law/society relation." 18 Looking at the RoL through a legal pluralist lens reveals a complex and constantly shifting and evolving assemblage of actors, norms and processes. Instead of a neatly constituted and institutionalized system of, say, 'checks and balances', 19 'constitutional democracy', 20 and the legality principle, 21 we are confronted with a living organism, pulsating and shaking, multidimensional and with sensitive nervous fibers, operating at different levels of the political, cultural and socio-economic system. Most importantly, however, the legal pluralist RoL presents us with a methodological challenge. Echoing the challenges that early private-law oriented approaches to comparative law would 18 pose for efforts to elaborate a comprehensive framework for the study of comparative public law, which does not reduce public law to anything 'governmental', done by the state 22 , the legal pluralist perspective on the RoL must seek to decenter the material infrastructure of the state, its institutions and processes as based on constitutional and administrative law.
II. Legal Pluralism and Its Many Effects
At the same time, we how may we explain the considerable gap between legal pluralist approaches to the study of the RoL and other contemporary work? Is there a valid concern of the use of a legal pluralist lens leading us too far away from what would otherwise have been the conceptual frameworks to be employed for the task of studying The problem with the opening of the door to contesting voices is that not only is the door never to be shut again, but it also becomes clear how that door can at best only ever have been a curtain, a drapery, a sound-muffling cloth that both blocked the view "How can we escape this trap? How can we overcome the continuing legacy of lawand-development thinking? How can critical scholarly perspectives, from inside and outside the region, foster a horizontal transnational dialogue among equals about law in Latin America? How can we create a community of scholars that produce richer theoretical and empirical analyses, and foster legal practices that deepen democracy, equality, plurality and human rights in Latin America?" 35 Among the elements he identifies in the existing and emerging socio-legal scholarship in Latin America to contribute to a more locally oriented analysis and understanding, is the detailed study of different constitutionalist projects in the region, focusing not only on the place of socio-economic rights in many constitutional texts, but on the particular role played by constitutional courts and tribunals in enforcing such rights. Connected hereto and indeed echoing the analysis offered by Sieder and her colleagues is the emphasis on the importance of impact studies regarding the real-world consequences of ambitious constitutional shifts. 36 Another important application site in this regard is the intensification in courts as well as public debates of the treatment of and the engagement with rights of indigenous and other racially discriminated peoples, brought into the spotlight of wide attention, for example, through the growing resistance against the granting of mining licenses for foreign multinationals and the frequent cases of expropriation and dramatic displacement of affected indigenous communities. 37 In the transnational theory of law (TTL)…" [PZ transl.] On p.16, he continues: "La TTD se produce comúnmente en un lugar que me gustaría caracterizar abstractamente come 'sitio de producción'. Un sitio de producción parece ser un medio especial en donde se producen discusiones iusteóricas con altos niveles de influencia transnacional sobre la naturaleza y las políticas del derecho. Los sitios de producción están usualmente afincados en los círculos intelectuales e instituciones académicas de Estados-nación centrales y prestigiosos." And, on p.17, he goes to contrast them with the 'sites of reception': "La contracara des los sitios de producción son los sitios de recepción. Dentro de un sitio de recepción, por lo general, la iusteoría producida allí ya no tiene la persuasividad y circulacíon amplia de la TTD, sino que, por el contrario, uno estaría tentado a hablar major de iusteoría 'local', 'regional', 'particular' o 'comparada'." 35 Rodríguez-Garavito, Remapping, at 5. 36 Rodríguez-Garavito, Remapping, at 9. 37 Id., at 11-12. See also the United Nations' "Indigenous Peoples Indigenous Voices Fact .pdf, highlighting the remaining lack of clarity in distinguishing between 'indirect expropriation' and legitimate, noncompensable regulation: "Scholars recognised the existence of the distinction but did not shed much light on the criteria for making the distinction. This may reflect reluctance to attempt to lay down simple, clear rules in a matter that is subject to so many varying and complex factual patterns and a preference to leave the resolution of the problem to the development of arbitral decisions on a case-by-case basis." (Id., at 9-10). 41 within the body of foreign investment law, 42 arguably without too much concern for the perspective of the displaced peoples affected by the FDI.
How, then, can we study the connections between these dramatic conflicts between different contentions regarding the content of economic and political rights, on the one hand, and the changing perspectives in comparative and 'global' constitutional law, on the other? Which methodological tools are required to make visible the place of the 'RoL' in a much wider space of legal-theoretical and socio-economic contention? An important set of sign-posts can be taken from 'law and development' scholarship in which the assertion of the RoL has always been contested and where scholars have long been stressing the importance of studying the presently offered models of the RoL against a complex and violent history of colonial rule and imperialism. 43 This scholarship has very productively informed and been in dialogue with work on indigenous rights, legal pluralism and the more recently emerged concept of 'transformative constitutionalism'. 44 These, admittedly crudely preliminary and selective, insights gained from no more than a glimpse at constitutionalism discourses in Latin America through the lens of locally altitude of theoretical discourses alone. And it is the resistance against such abstract and, by consequence, hegemonizing theorizing which informs and drives a lot of critical, local scholarship and which experts in the Global North and the West need to engage with. 45 As the 21 st century promises more geopolitical change and North-South and South-South shifts, traditions of American and European constitutionalism are not likely to provide the all-sufficient conceptual and theoretical guidelines. 46 Similar impulses to rethink, to re-localise and to critically reassess the Western influence on shaping 'global' and 'comparative' constitutional law as the taken-forgranted frameworks for thinking about the Rule of Law also come from Asia. Not only are important and groundbreaking judicial developments widely discussed as matters of not merely 'local' concern 47 , but what becomes visible is a far-reaching critique of many of the inherited assumptions regarding the purpose and scope of comparative constitutional law:
"The dominant players in the field of comparative law extolled the virtues of a 'functionalist' approach which would use comparative models and examples to solve problems and arrive at practical solutions. It was therefore natural that comparative constitutional law would also be affected by this overall approach. 45 Subsequently, comparative law also developed a more 'universalist' rationale, which posits that a community's conceptions of law, politics, and justice could be enriched by studying foreign experiences." 48 Resisting the circular referral to the 'usual suspects' in global/comparative constitutional law -including "Canada, Israel, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States" 49 in fostering certain models of economic governance through state institutions. 54 As much of Western legal and political theory remains focused on the analysis of the rise of the nation state, the role and legacies of civil revolutions and the fate of the story, the 'other', the alternative perspective on the described trajectory. This kind of Eurocentrism has thus become object of various critical attacks, 58 and legal scholarship's engagement with postcolonial studies must be seen, at least in those quarters where it is occurring, as both irreversible and transformative. 59 65 The end of the Cold War came to provide the historical moment for a long-harbored normative closure: human rights could and, indeed, should now be defended, fought for and fought over in every corner of the world, now that their previous ideological ambiguity had given way to universal recognition. 66 With the overcoming of its ideological subtexts at the time of the cold war, human rights were now rid of all ideology -they were, in other words, "universally true" and, by implication, free from and immune to any possible contestation. 67 Meanwhile, the RoL becomes entrenched as development doctrine, mantra and goal when it is rhetorically employed to link the imagined international community to the individuals living (and justifiably enjoying a "right to democracy" 68 ) within states rather than being the governing principle for the relationship between states. 69 As liberal international relations (IR) scholars such as Anne-Marie Slaughter zero in on the internal governance structures of the state, the shift from a world of sovereign states to that of a world community as agent of scrutinizing, protecting as well as, eventually, disseminating and promoting state-internal democratic governance becomes decisive. 70 The particular Western, if not U.S.-driven, experience of institutionalized democratic market governance becomes the unquestioned blue-print for the Rule of Law 71 as transnational principle and as justification for an ever-accelerating and expanding managerialist protection machine. 72 Professor Pahuya's award-winning analysis addressed the "instability of international law" at a time, where the world order had become increasingly and perhaps irrevocably fragmented and contested. Bringing together a number of critical strands of international legal thought -from international economic law 73 to post-colonialist 'third world approaches to international law' 74 for a convincing deconstruction of the international-universalist human rights and RoL imaginary, she offered significant assistance to concurring and since emerging efforts of recasting the conceptual and legal framework of the global order -and, remarkably -with the RoL at its center. and 'security' in the context of national survival 85 , 'human suffering' to justify military intervention 86 or 'modernisation' in the case of FDI-related economic liberalization and urban transformation policies. 87 By consequence, it fills the gap that an elusive hope for global political deliberation has left. In a recent book, David Kennedy offers a sobering analysis of the increasingly hermeneutically closed, self-referential language regime that 'experts' (lawyers, economists, political scientists) have been making available for amenable use for every possible 'crisis'. "Expertise -economic expertise, scientific expertise, legal expertise, social and political expertise, institutional and managerial expertise, expertise in the lessons of history and the universal practicalities of everyday life -fills the bill. Those who exercise the powers of expertise rarely think they are 'governing the world'. Their mandate and project is always far more specific, their language more universal. As a result, their powers remain obscure, the opportunity to identify and contest their rulership vanishing point rare." 88 What makes the power of expert language so pervasive and at the same time so elusive from the point of view of political agency, is the matter-of-factness in its ascertainment vis-à-vis 'problems' seeking a solution. "Although we might come to see the situation as driven by power politics, geostrategic interests, regional rivalries, or historic grievance, these also need to be articulated. They are also made real -or not -through practices that confirm the analytics. Such modes of interpretation and methods of engagement are developed, deployed, and defended in specialized terms." 89 IV. Today's Global Rule of Law: Governance by Drones and Numbers?
What can be summarized at this point, by way of conclusion? There is little doubt today as regards the centrality of RoL assertions in global governance programmes, but at the same time the striking number of contestations, be that on the conceptual or the empirical level, underscores the urgency of further and also differently situated investigation. What the work by scholars cited in the preceding overview illustrates is a pressing need for approaches that critically acknowledge and draw on legal-theoretical and post-colonial scholarship in order to decenter and relativize an otherwise too narrowly shaped investigation into the past and future of a heavily strained concept.
The legal pluralist engagement with the RoL might point into a promising direction here. Rather than confirming the cliché of an emerging transnational regulatory order that dethrones the nation-state, makes a mockery of state-based, governmental sovereignty and adopts an overly permissive stance as to what counts as 'law', hereby allegedly treating soft and hard, informal and formal law alike, the above analysis has confirmed something altogether different. Instead of heralding the end of the state and (its) law, the legal pluralist lens has begun to make visible the many local instantiations of legal-regulatory regimes in states of transformation. Pahuja's study, but even more particularly the analysis offered by Rajah, offered us a convincing testimony of the battle over the rule of law 'on the ground', in very concrete and complex, historically shaped and presently evolving socio-economic and geopolitical settings. As we continue to further study the ROL's continuing diffusion and transformation in the areas of technical warfare 90 and quantification, 91 questions of local perspective, input and contestation will become ever more important. 89 Id., at 110. 90 John Kaag & Sara Kreps, Drone Warfare (2014). 91 The World of Indicators. The Making of Governmental Knowledge through Quantification (Richard Rottenburg, Sally E. Merry, Sung-Joon Park and Johanna Mugler eds., 2015).
